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1. Introduction 
Modern description of game theory is generally considered to have been started with the 
book "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior" [1]. Modern game theory has grown extremely 
well, in particular after the influential results of Nash [2-4]. It has been widely applied to 
many problems in economics, engineering, politics, etc.  
A game is a model of a situation where two or more groups are in dispute over some issues 
[5]. The participants in a game are called the players. The possible actions available to 
players are referred to as strategies. When each player selects a strategy, it will determine an 
outcome to the game and the payoffs to all players, while tries to maximize his own payoff.  
Classical game theory uses the extensive form and the strategic form to explain a game. The 
extensive form is represented by a game tree, in which the players make sequential actions. 
However, the strategic form is usually used to describe games with two decision makers, in 
which players' choices are made simultaneously. Unlike one-player decision making, where 
optimality has a clear sense, in multi person decision making the optimality is in the form of 
NE. An NE strategy is a strategy wherein, if a player knows his opponent’s strategy, he is 
totally satisfied and is unwilling to change his strategy. 
In classical game theory it is assumed that all data of a game are known exactly by players. 
However, in real games, the players are often not able to evaluate exactly the game due to 
lack of information and precision in the available information of the situation. Harsanyi [6] 
treated imprecision in games with a probabilistic method and developed the theory of 
Bayesian games. This theory could not entirely solve the problem of imprecision in games, 
because it was limited to only one possible kind of imprecision. However, in reality, 
imprecision is of different types and can be modeled by fuzzy sets. The notion of fuzzy sets 
first appeared in the paper written by Zadeh [7]. This notion tries to show that to what 
degree an element belongs to a set. The degree, to which an element belongs to a set, is an 
element of the continuous interval [0, 1] rather than the Boolean values. Using the notion of 
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fuzzy sets, each component in a game (set of players, set of strategies, set of payoffs, etc) can 
be fuzzified. Initially, fuzzy sets were used by Butnariu [8] in non-cooperative game theory. 
He used fuzzy sets to represent the belief of each player for strategies of other players. Since 
then, fuzzy set theory has been used in many non-cooperative [9-15] and cooperative games 
[16-17].  
In this chapter, we will extend the NE set to fuzzy set in games with fuzzy numbers as 
payoffs. In this regard, using ranking fuzzy numbers, a fuzzy preference relation is 
constructed over payoffs and then the resultant priorities of payoffs are considered as the 
grades of being NE.  Hence, if a player knows the opponent’s strategy, he is satisfied with 
his own strategy by the degree that this strategy has priority for him. The more priority the 
players feel for each strategy, the more possible the strategy becomes the game’s 
equilibrium. This generalization shows the distribution of Nash grades in the matrix form of 
the game. In other words, we can consider strategies with high grades of equilibrium which 
are not necessarily the equilibrium points. In the proposed approach, the effect of different 
viewpoints (optimism and pessimism) on the result of the game is also studied. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the backgrounds on 
fuzzy set theory. This section discusses the basic definition of fuzzy numbers, fuzzy 
extension principle and ranking fuzzy numbers. Section 3 briefly presents the fuzzy 
preference relation and a way to obtain priorities from fuzzy preference matrix. In this 
section, preference ordering of the alternatives and its transformation into fuzzy preference 
relation is also discussed. Section 4 introduces the proposed algorithm to find the Nash 
grades for pure and mixed strategies in the matrix form of the game. Two examples and 
their detailed results are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 contains some concluding 
remarks. 
2. Backgrounds on fuzzy set theory 
There are two well-known frameworks for quantifying the lack of knowledge and precision, 
namely, probabilistic and possibilistic uncertainty type. The probabilistic framework deals 
with the uncertain events with a probability distribution function (PDF). However, there are 
some situations in which there is not much information about the PDF of uncertain 
parameters or they are inherently not repeatable. In possibilistic framework, for each 
uncertain event M , a membership function ( )
M
x  is defined which describes how much 
each element x , of universe of discourse U (the set of all values that x can take) belongs to
M . Different types of membership functions can be used to describe uncertain values. 
Fuzzy numbers have also been used in many decision making problems. The following 
definition of fuzzy numbers is most commonly used [18]; 
Definition 1: The fuzzy number M is a convex normalized fuzzy set of the real line R such 
that 
1. There is exactly one 0x with 0( ) 1M x  . 
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2. ( )
M
x  is piecewise continuous. 
 ( ) , 0,1M x R M x           is also called  -cut of M . From definition 1,  -cuts of a 
fuzzy number M are closed real intervals, that is 
 , 0, 1M a b             (1) 
2.1. Fuzzy extension principle 
Fuzzy extension principle, which was introduced by Zadeh in [19], is an essential principle 
in fuzzy set theory to generalize the concepts and structures of classical mathematics to 
fuzzy mathematics as follows [20] 
Definition 2: Let 1 , , nU U are UoDs and 1 nU U U    be their Cartesian product. Also 
assume that 1 , , nM M
   are fuzzy subsets of 1 , , nU U , respectively. Moreover, let  1 , , ny f x x   be a mapping from U to Y . Now if  1 , , nB f M M   , then the 
membership function of B is defined as follows 
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 (2) 
Based on the above definition, one-dimensional operators and two-dimensional operators 
on fuzzy numbers can be represented by the following definitions, respectively.  
Definition 3: Assume that M is a fuzzy number and :f R R is a one-dimensional 
operator. According to fuzzy extension principle,  f M  is a fuzzy set with the following 
membership function 
      
   
 
1
,
1
sup
0
M
x y f x
f M
x f y
y
f y
 





   

  (3) 
In definition 3, if  f x x  , then the scalar product of the real value  into fuzzy number
M  is a fuzzy number with the following membership function 
  M M xx         (4) 
Definition 4: Assume that M and N are fuzzy numbers and :f R R R  is a two-
dimensional operator. According to fuzzy extension principle, M N   is a fuzzy set with 
the following membership function 
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    sup min ( ), ( )M N M N
z x y
z x y          (5) 
As a special case, the result of the summation operator is also a fuzzy number as follows  
    sup min ( ), ( )M N M N
z x y
z x y         (6) 
2.2. Ranking fuzzy numbers 
Ranking fuzzy numbers seems a necessary procedure in decision making when alternatives 
are fuzzy numbers. Various methods for ranking fuzzy subsets have been proposed. Yager 
in [21] introduced a function for ranking fuzzy subsets in unit interval which is based on the 
integral of mean of the  -cuts. Jain in [22], Baldwin and Guild in [23] were also suggested 
methods for ordering fuzzy subsets in the unit interval. Ibanez and Munoz in [24] have 
developed a subjective approach for ranking fuzzy numbers. In this chapter, we use the 
subjective approach, as introduced in [24].  
Ibanez and Munoz in [24] defined the following number as the average index for M  
 ( ) ( ) ( )P M
Y
V M f dP M U       (7) 
where Y is a subset of the unit interval and P is a probability distribution on Y .  
The definition of 
M
f  could be subjective for decision maker. In [24] the following definition 
for 
M
f  has been suggested, in which the parameter  determines the optimism-pessimism 
degree of the decision maker 
 : , ( ) (1 )M Mf Y R f b a
 
         (8) 
where [0,1] and ,M a b      . 
When an optimistic decision maker ( 1  ) wants to choose the greatest value, the upper 
extreme of the interval ( b ) would be chosen, i.e. he prefers to choose the greatest possible 
value. A pessimism person ( 0  ) on the opposite prefers to decide on the lower extreme of 
the interval      ( a ).  
Using ( )PV  in (7), the ordering relations between fuzzy numbers A and B can be given as 
 ( ) ( ) ,P PA B V A V B A B U           (9) 
The fuzzy number A is not preferred to B , if and only if their average index is the same 
 ( ) ( ) ,P PA B V A V B A B U           (10) 
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For convenience, let [0,1]Y   and P is the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1], as used in [24]. Then, 
the following ( )PV M
 is derived for a specific   
  1
0
( ) (1 )PV M b a d       (11) 
As a special case, the average index for triangular fuzzy numbers can be given as follows 
 
1
( )
2L
V b a b     (12) 
where, a triangular fuzzy number with notation ( , , )M T a c b is used as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Triangular fuzzy number, ( , , )M T a c b . 
3. Preference relations 
3.1. Fuzzy preference relations  
Preference relation is one of the most regular tools for stating decision maker's preferences. 
In the process of making decision, individuals are asked to give their preferences over an 
alternative, which is based on their comparison according to one's desire. Various kinds of 
preference relations have been developed including multiplicative preference relation [25], 
fuzzy preference relation [26], linguistic preference relation [27] and intuitionistic preference 
relation [28]. 
For a decision making situation, let  1 2, , , nX x x x   be a discrete set of alternatives. A 
preference relation P on the set X is defined by a function P X X D    , where D is the 
domain of representation of preference degrees provided by the decision maker for each 
pair of alternatives. In many situations, due to lack of information about the problems, the 
goals, constraints and consequences are not precisely known. Because of these uncertainties, 
fuzzy set theory allows a more flexible framework to express the preferences. Fuzzy 
preferences show the fuzziness of the decision maker's preferences. In [26], fuzzy preference 
relation is defined as follows. 
Definition 5: A fuzzy preference relation R on the set X is defined as a matrix  ij
n n
R r   
with some properties given as 
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1,
0, , 1,2,...,
0.5,
ij ji
ij
ii
r r
r i j n
r
      
 (13) 
where ijr denotes the preference degree of the alternative ix to jx .  
In particular, 0.5ijr  shows indifference between ix and jx . The case of 0.5ijr  indicates that
ix is preferred to jx . As ijr increases, the degree of preference gets larger. Also 1ijr  shows 
that ix is absolutely preferred to jx and vice versa. 
Deriving priorities, that is the degrees of importance of alternatives, are the main aspect of 
preference relations. Quite a number of approaches have been developed to derive priorities 
from fuzzy preference relations. Lipovetsky and Michael-Conklin [29] introduced an 
optimization approach and an eigen-problem to produce robust priority estimation of a 
fuzzy preference relation. Xu [30] developed a weighted least square approach and an 
eigenvector method for priorities of fuzzy preference relations. Xu and Da [31] proposed the 
Least Deviation method to obtain the priority vector of a fuzzy preference relation and 
considered its properties. In this chapter, we use the Least Deviation method presented in 
[31] to derive priorities from fuzzy preference relation. The algorithm to derive priorities in 
[31] is mentioned briefly as follows. 
Let ( )ij n nR r  be a fuzzy preference relation and  1 2, , , nW w w w  be the priority vector 
which is going to be calculated such that iw  shows the degree of priority of alternative ix , 
with the following properties 
 
1
1; 0
n
i i
i
w w

   (14) 
Let k  be the number of iterations: 
Step 1. Initialize the weight 1 2,(0) ( , , , )nW w w w  , specify parameter 0 1   and let  
0k  . 
Step 2. Calculate the following term, where (2 1)( ) 9 ij
r
ijh r
  
  
1
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ,
( ) ( )
n
j i
i ij ji
j i j
w k w k
w k h r h r i
w k w k


                
  (15) 
If  ( )i w k  for all i , then update w by ( )w k and go to step 5, otherwise continue with 
step 3. 
 
Nash Equilibrium Strategies in Fuzzy Games 315 
Step 3.     1( ) max ( )nm i iw k w k  , calculate ( )T k and then ( )ix k using 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
j m
mj jm
j m j mm j
w k w k
T k h r h r
w k w k 
                        
   (16) 
 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
m
i
i
T k w k
x k
w k
 
 (17) 
Step 4. Set 1k k   and go to step 2. 
Step 5. Obtain w as the priority vector. 
Step 6. End. 
3.2. Preference ordering of the alternatives 
Individuals usually provide their preferences over the alternatives by preference ordering. 
Let's assume that an expert expresses his preferences on X by a preference ordering
 1 2( ), ( ), , ( )nO o x o x o x  . It is assumed that the lower the position of the alternative in the 
preference ordering, the more contentment for the individual. For instance, an expert states his 
preference ordering on  1 2 3, ,X x x x  by the following ordering; 1 2 3( ) 2, ( ) 1, ( ) 3o x o x o x   .  
This means that the alternative x2 is the best and alternative x3 is the worst.  
3.3. Transforming preference ordering into fuzzy preference relation 
An alternative satisfies the decision maker according to its position in the ordering 
preference relation.  Various mappings to transform the ordering preference relation into 
fuzzy preference relation have been proposed [32-34]. In [32] a crisp relation was introduced 
for assessing the fuzzy preference relation, where the preference between alternatives
ix and
jx depends only on the values of ( )io x and ( )jo x . In [33-34], the following relations was 
introduced to achieve fuzzy preference relation from an ordering preference 
 
( ) 1
( ) 1
1
i
i
o x
v x
n
    (18) 
  1 1 ( ) ( )
2ij i j
r v x v x    (19) 
where ijr  denotes the preference between alternatives ix and jx . 
4. Fuzzy games 
In a strategic game, there are n players and ins strategies for player i . Suppose iX is the 
strategy set for player i  defined as follows 
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  1 2, ,..., ii i i ns iX x x x  (20) 
In pure strategy, let is  denotes the strategy chosen by player i and is  denotes the strategies 
chosen by the other players. Then 1( , , , , ) ( , )i i n i i is s s s s    is the payoff achieved by 
player i . By definition of classical game theory, * *1( , , )ns s is the pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium, if and only if [35] 
  * * * * *1 1( , , , , ) ( , , , , ) 1, , ,i i n i i n i is s s s s s i n s X            (21) 
In mixed strategy, each player assigns a probability distribution  1 , , ii i ns i i    over 
his strategies, where i determines all possible probability distributions for player i . Then, 
the expected payoff for player i is the real value  1 , ,i nE   , where E denotes the 
expectation operator. In this regard, mixed strategy Nash equilibrium * *1( , , )n   is defined 
as follows 
      * * * * *1 1, , , , , , , , 1, , ,i i n i i n i iE E i n                (22) 
In real games, players must often make their decisions under unclear or fuzzy information. 
In this regard, there are several approaches for explaining games with fuzzy set theory. As 
discussed earlier, a game has three main components: a set of players, a set of strategies and 
a set of payoffs. The set of players is defined as fuzzy set when the concept of coalition in 
cooperative games is fuzzified. Butnariu in [17] proposed core and stable sets in fuzzy 
coalition games, and introduced a degree of participation for players in a coalition. Mares in 
[16] considered fuzzy core in fuzzy cooperative games, where possibility for each fuzzy 
coalition was considered as fuzzy interval, and an extension of the core in classic TU games. 
He discussed Shapely value in cooperative games with deterministic characteristics and 
fuzzy coalitions. In [9], the concept of fuzzy strategies has been introduced. It defines a 
strategy set consisting of fuzzy subspaces of strategy spaces and assigned a fuzzy payoff for 
each set of player's strategies. Hence, they have defined a fuzzy inference system (fuzzy If-
Then rules). However, they have assumed some real values as strategies and have solved 
the games with common crisp methods. The first two steps seem rational for modeling any 
system according to its specifications, however the final step is not a reasonable fuzzy 
decision making approach to find NEs. Generally, since the final decision of a player is a 
number in real world problems, they can not adopt fuzzy strategies except when 
meaningful interpretations exist. However, we should remark that fuzzy strategies are 
constructive to model the games and calculate the payoffs.  
Defining payoffs as fuzzy sets is reasonable in the following two main situations, and lead 
to fuzzy numbers as payoffs. 
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1. When there is not sufficient information about the payoffs and they are not inherently 
repeatable.  
2. When calculation of payoffs is difficult or time-consuming. Hence, they are usually 
defined by fuzzy if-then rules.  
In this chapter, we consider pure and mixed strategies in games with fuzzy numbers as 
payoffs. In this regard, in pure strategies, ( , )i i is s is considered as a fuzzy number. Also, in 
mixed strategies, the expected values are calculated based on the fuzzy extension principle 
and definitions 3 and 4, because the payoffs are fuzzy numbers. 
5. Playing games with fuzzy numbers as payoffs 
In classical game theory, a crisp payoff is either greater than or less than others. However, in 
fuzzy ones, there are uncertainties in comparing fuzzy payoffs. We model these uncertainties 
using fuzzy preference relation on the preference ordering of the expected values. In this 
regard, using ranking fuzzy numbers, a fuzzy preference relation reflecting the uncertainties in 
payoffs is constructed and then, the resultant priorities of payoffs are considered as the grades 
of being NE.  This definition for the grade of being NE seems meaningful because if a player 
knows the opponent’s strategy, he is satisfied with his strategy by the degree that this strategy 
has priority for him. The more priority the players get for each strategy, the more possible the 
strategy is the game’s equilibrium. The proposed algorithm to find the grade of being NE for 
every mixed strategy is shown in Table 1. 
 
1. i , do steps 2-9. 
2. For player i , determine the optimism-pessimism degree  . 
3. i , do steps 4-9. 
4. Fix the opponent's mixed strategy i  . 
5. i , calculate the average index of the resultant expected value according to (11). 
6. Order the expected values according to their average index in descending order, 
according to (9). 
7. Transform the ordering preference relation into fuzzy preference relation according to 
(18-19). 
8. Derive priorities of expected values from the resultant fuzzy preference relation based on 
the least deviation method.   
9. For every mixed strategy  ,i i  , set its grade of being NE equal to its corresponding 
priorities. 
10. For every mixed strategy  ,i i  , set its overall grade of being NE equal to the 
minimum of its grade of being NE for each player. 
Table 1. Algorithm to find the grade of being NE for each mixed strategy 
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6. Simulation results 
6.1. Application in pure strategy 
In this subsection, games with two players are considered because of their easier 
understanding. However, our algorithm can be implemented to more than two players. 
Consider a fuzzy game, as defined in Table 2. Player one and player two have three 
strategies, namely a1, a2, a3 and b1, b2, b3, respectively. Each cell includes two fuzzy 
triangular numbers as payoffs; the first for player one and the second for player two. 
 
 1 2,   b1 b2 b3 
a1 T(4,5,6),T(1,3,5) T(5,6,7),T(2,3,4) T(4,5,6),T(1.5,3,4.5) 
a2 T(2,3,4),T(0,1,2) T(1,3,5),T(3,4,5) T(2,3,4),T(1,3,5) 
a3 T(3,4,5),T(2,4,6) T(3,5,7),T(1,3,5) T(6,7,8),T(4,6,8) 
Table 2. A sample game with fuzzy payoffs 
Implementing the algorithm presented in Table 1, there can be several grades of being NE 
for the game corresponding to different  s. Tables 3 and 4 present the priority of each 
payoff according to possible choices of  . 
 
 b1 b2 b3 
a1 (0.7,0.08) (0.7,0.7) (0.22,0.22) 
a2 (0.08,0.08) (0.08,0.7) (0.08,0.22) 
a3 (0.22,0.22) (0.22,0.08) (0.7,0.7) 
Table 3. Priorities of payoffs for λ ≤ ¼ 
 
 b1 b2 b3 
a1 (0.7,0.7) (0.7,0.08) (0.22,0.22) 
a2 (0.08,0.08) (0.08,0.7) (0.08,0.22) 
a3 (0.22,0.22) (0.22,0.08) (0.7,0.7) 
Table 4. Priorities of payoffs for λ > 1/4 
The minimum priority of all payoffs in a cell is interpreted now as the grade of being Nash 
equilibrium of that cell. The results of the mentioned game is tabulated in Tables 5 and 6 for 
the possible choice of  , respectively 
 
Nash Equilibrium Strategies in Fuzzy Games 319 
 b1 b2 b3 
a1 0.08 0.7 0.22 
a2 0.08 0.08 0.08 
a3 0.22 0.08 0.7 
Table 5. Grades of being NE for λ ≤ 1/4 
 b1 b2 b3 
a1 0.7 0.08 0.22 
a2 0.08 0.08 0.08 
a3 0.22 0.08 0.7 
Table 6. Grades of being NE for λ > 1/4 
The difference between the results of Tables 5 and 6 is meaningful. As the player 2 becomes 
optimistic, he prefers to choose the greatest possible outcome. Hence, between three 
alternatives (3,2), (3,1), (3,1.5)T T T , (3,2)T has the most priority. But a pessimistic player 
prefers to choose alternative (3,1)T . 
6.2. Application in mixed strategy 
In this subsection, mixed strategies in bi-matrix games are considered. Consider a fuzzy bi-
matrix game as defined in Table 7.  
 1 2,   b1 b2 
a1 T(10,11,12),T(3,4,5) T(3,4,5),T(0.5,2,3.5) 
a2 T(2,4,6),T(0,1,2) T(6,7,8),T(2,4,6) 
Table 7. A sample game with fuzzy payoffs 
Using the proposed approach, every mixed strategy has a grade of being NE as shown in 
Figures 2 and 3 for each neutral player ( 0.5  ). 
 
Figure 2. Grades of being NE for Player 1 
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Figure 3. Grades of being NE for Player 2 
Now, the minimum priorities for players can be interpreted as the overall grades of being 
NE. We remark that the minimum operator can be replaced by any other T-norms. The 
results of the game presented in Table 7, is shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Grades of being NE for neutral players  
Grade of being NE is high around two pure strategies, that is  1 2(0,1), (0,1)p p  and 1 2(1,0), (1,0)p p  . The mixed strategy  1 2(0.7,0.3), (0.3,0.7)p p   has also high grade 
of being NE.  
In addition, the effect of optimism-pessimism degree of players in distribution of Nash 
grades is studied. For instance, if two players are optimistic ( 1  ), the Nash grades are the 
same as Figure 5. If two players are pessimistic ( 0  ), the Nash grades are the same as 
Figure 6. 
The difference between the results of Figures 4 and 5 is important. As the player becomes 
optimistic, he prefers to choose the greatest possible outcome. Hence, payoff (4,1.5)T gets 
more priority than payoff (4,1)T . In addition, Nash grades for neutral players are 
approximately the combination of Nash grades for optimistic and pessimistic players.  
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Figure 5. Grades of being NE for optimistic players 
 
 
Figure 6. Grades of being NE for pessimistic players 
7. Conclusion 
In this chapter, some concepts in fuzzy sets including fuzzy numbers, fuzzy extension 
principle, ranking of fuzzy numbers and fuzzy preference relations were briefly introduced 
and consequently used to develop a new approach for practically analyzing the games with 
fuzzy numbers as payoffs. In this regard, a fuzzy preference relation was constructed on the 
preference ordering of payoffs using ranking fuzzy numbers. The priority of each payoff then 
was derived using the least deviation method. The priorities of payoffs were interpreted as the 
grades of being NE. We should remark that, in this chapter, we were not looking to show the 
pure and mixed strategy NEs, but rather we tried to assign a graded membership to each 
strategy to determine how much it is NE, i.e. it has the possibility for being NE. 
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